Post-macroeconomics -- reflections on the crisis and strategic directions ahead by Monga, Celestin
Policy Research Working Paper 4986
Post-Macroeconomics






WPS4986Produced by the Research Support Team
Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 4986
For decades, many researchers argued that economics 
had nothing to fear from enriching itself with lessons 
and advances from other disciplines. Unfortunately, 
these suggestions were either neglected or dismissed 
upfront in what was then arbitrarily considered 
mainstream economics. The global crisis has led 
even Nobel Prize winners to acknowledge that the 
problem facing economists and policy makers today 
is mostly intellectual—it is the need to confront the 
systematic failure of thinking, especially on the part of 
macroeconomists. Despite its unprecedented magnitude 
and heavy financial, human, and intellectual cost, the 
crisis certainly does not invalidate everything that has 
been learned about macroeconomics. However, the costs 
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highlight some of mistakes of the dominant intellectual 
macroeconomic framework. Post-macroeconomics 
should not be understood as another metanarrative 
of the end of metanarratives. The use of the prefix 
post here suggests and emphasizes much more than 
temporal posterity. Post-macroeconomics should 
follow from macroeconomics more than it follows after 
macroeconomics. The theorizing of post-macroeconomics 
is therefore neither systematically oppositional nor 
hegemonic. It does not advocate a “dialectic opposition” 
between macroeconomics and post-macroeconomics. 
Rather, it suggests that the latter builds on the former 
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 “Theory is when you know everything but nothing works.  
Practice is when everything works but nobody knows why.  
We have put together theory and practice: 







At a  recent annual conference of the  African Literature Association in Burlington, 
Vermont, I was teased by some eminent professors of letters who seemed surprised to see 
an economist sauntering serenely in such a noble gathering, at a time when his own 
discipline was being discredited  in newspaper  headlines. None of these critics  had 
personally lost their job or retirement pension in the financial debacle that has rocked the 
world since 2007. In fact, these academics, who sometimes occupy tenure-track faculty 
positions,  had gathered in peaceful Vermont  to discuss esoteric topics like “The 
Intersubjective Dialogue in the Age of Globalization” or “Postcolonialism and 
Postcoloniality in Relation to Africa and Blackness”. The incongruous presence at this 
precious assembly of an intruder like me, a representative of a discipline battered and 
bruised by prevailing global turmoil, seemed to offer a surplus of gracious solemnity and 
dignity to their irritation. Listening to them, I was impressed with the admirable empathy 
these researchers in the humanities felt for the poor citizens of the planet.  Their 
compassion for world victims of economics was such that some of them suggested to me, 
in a hardly facetious tone, to initiate a petition urging the Nobel Foundation to stop giving 
a prize in economic sciences. 
 
The teasing was perhaps partly due the fact that the Nobel Prize, which rewards one or 
more people “for their exceptional contribution to economic sciences”, has suffered from 
a severe legitimacy deficit since its inception. It is the only prize that was not in the will 
of Alfred Nobel.  While it is awarded by the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences like 
the others, it has been granted only since 1968 (1900 for the others) and is endowed by 
the Bank of Sweden. In truth, some of its laureates were distinguished for rather 
approximate and untested theories. Others who were hailed as infallible geniuses found 
themselves in the midst of resounding bankruptcies when they tried to put their ideas into 
practice. A few others never studied nor practiced economics.
1
                                                 
1 Robert Merton and Myron Scholes were associated with the hedge fund Long Term Capital Management 
whose quasi-bankruptcy in 1988 subjected the international banking system to the greatest financial risks. 
Daniel Kahneman and Robert Aumann, Nobel Prize laureates in 2002 and 2005, are respectively 
psychologist and mathematician. 
 
 But were these sufficient 
reasons to question the legitimacy of the highest distinction bestowed on economic 
science? I could have fired back by reminding my interlocutors that literature is probably 
the field where the award of the Nobel Prize has been the most controversial! But our 




*  * 
 
The global financial and economic crisis—which “officially” started in the middle of 
2007— has been a major source of the renewed distrust towards economics. Its severity 
has added to the confusion in the identification of its causes, and to the validity of a lot of 
the economic knowledge. In fact, by claiming to know precisely when the crisis started, 
economists implicitly assume to have understood its origins and implications. Yet, things 
are less obvious than the conventional economic wisdom would like to admit.  
 
There is another way of analyzing the origins of the current global crisis. It requires that 
one avoids two pitfalls, namely: the defensive attitude of free market fundamentalists 
who maintain that there is basically nothing wrong with the way the capitalist system has 
been functioning, and the rigidity in judgment of certain altermondialist activists who 
believe their long-awaited moment for taking revenge on capitalism has finally come. It 
is obviously not easy to position oneself at equidistance of the mostly ideological 
wrangling and suspicious unanimity that characterize these two camps. Yet, it is an 
imperative if one wants to escape both the deterministic trap of free market 
fundamentalists and the catastrophist stance of altermondialist activists.   
 
The crisis has often been presented as a direct consequence of the unfortunate decisions 
made by a few misguided American bankers taking advantage of a poorly regulated 
capitalist system. This paper suggests instead  that its fundamental cause  goes well 
beyond that. Looking at the first-order conditions to the crisis, it points to the failure of 
macroeconomic thought and its humility deficit. Despite its important progress in many 
areas, macroeconomics became so satisfied with its own rigid methodology that it 
underestimated or neglected the advantages it could draw from other disciplines, notably 
from microeconomics, its closest neighbor.  A  dominant, minimalist macroeconomic 
model encouraged the emergence of a rigid analytical framework which has been used by 
most public policy designers and central bank managers around the world. Unfortunately, 
this framework proved ineffective in predicting the inevitable spirals of a globalized and 
unregulated system of market economy, a system prone to excesses, and that triggered off 
a Darwinian effect of planetary proportions. 
 
This is not the moment to point accusing fingers or to defend selfish ideological 
ambitions. It is time to celebrate the funeral of this form of restrictive and ineffective 
macroeconomics, and to recreate another from it. This paper suggests that the time has 
come to develop post-macroeconomics, which would be analytical frameworks that are 
enriched by findings from microeconomics, psychology, sociology or political science. 
Section 2 sets the stage for such a transformation by describing the root cause of the 
current crisis and the analytical arrogance which guided economic thought and modeling 
during the preceding decades. Section 3 explains how the intellectual consensus model 
generated the myth of the so-called Great Moderation, which misled central bank 
executives and encouraged the development of securitization. Section 4 outlines the paths 
to a new approach towards post-macroeconomics. Section 5 summarizes the argument 
and offers concluding thoughts. 4 
 
2. ANALYTICAL ARROGANCE 
 
The Initial Theoretical Delusion 
 
The current crisis is primarily one of economic thought and of the way public policies 
have been designed, legitimized and implemented in much of central banks in the West 
for much of the past half-century. To understand it, it is necessary to revisit the early part 
of the 1960s when macroeconomists were quick to draw very optimistic lessons from 
what they believed to have learned from the Great Depression and from the boom of the 
post-war period. Infatuated by the sovereignty of their knowledge, they only could saw 
the obvious before their eyes: economists appeared to themselves to be geniuses and 
demigods who could manufacture prosperity at will, create customized wealth, and 
distribute it to various social groups of each country on the basis of ideological 
preferences and socio-political considerations. The only  objective of macroeconomic 
policy was the management business cycles, so they thought. John Maynard Keynes, the 
most influential English economist of the twentieth century, was celebrated as a guru 
whose prescriptions on matters of public policy were to be endorsed without the least 
hesitation or questioning.  
 
Keynesian economics had yielded a very straightforward conclusion: in market 
economies, central banks and governments  could use the two main macroeconomic 
instruments - monetary policy and budgetary policy - to freely set the unemployment rate 
at a desired level, providing that a certain rate of inflation is factored in. In short, 
macroeconomic management boiled down to an inflation-unemployment trade-off 
exercise guided by the ideological, social or policy preferences of the authorities. 
 
This initial consensus led to the establishment of a quasi-stable relationship between the 
nominal wage growth rate and the unemployment rate. The relationship was diagnosed in 
a famous curve  (Philips, 1958). It complemented and reinforced the fixed-price 
Keynesian model. Almost everyone was ecstatic about such a simple and elegant idea: 
the authoritative curve made it possible to explain inflation in a clear manner. The curve 
seemed rather convincing and showed visually that when the unemployment rate 
decreases, nominal wages increase and impacted general price levels. Wage inflation 
explained the increase in the general level of prices. Like an infallible oracle, the curve 
showed that one could only decrease unemployment at the cost of an increase in inflation. 
Conversely, if one chose to reduce inflation, it would be necessary to put up with a rise in 
unemployment. Eureka!, the community of macroeconomists proclaimed. Finance 
Ministers worldwide had found the secret equation of economic management. It was just 
a matter of trading off two priorities, resolving the dilemma between inflation and 
unemployment. 
 
It was however the first serious mistake in economic thinking. Although the general 
intuition of Philips  (the  author of the famous curve)  and Keynes’s analysis  were 
reasonable, they both rested on shaky assumptions, especially the idea that public 
policymakers can manipulate at will economic agents. Such a postulate was oblivious of 
the fact that nothing is permanent, and that nothing is stable. The schematic reasoning 5 
 
underlying the presumed stable relationship between inflation and unemployment was the 
slow adjustment of nominal wages. Yes, of course: if the latter are constant while the rate 
of inflation is positive, it means that real wages are down and that the demand for labor 
demand is up. More jobs are therefore available and there is less unemployment.  
 
But this reasoning is valid only if workers agree to work more because they expect real 
wages to rise. This is why they contend themselves with nominal wages that increase in 
practice, albeit less rapidly than inflation. Keynesian theory thus assumed that workers 
are actually ensnared by the relative rigidity of nominal wages
2
Macroeconomists went off track, but some of them who studied African markets quickly 
realized their mistake
  and by their own 
monetary illusions—they confuse an increase in nominal wage with an increase in their 
purchasing power.  
 
Was this initial basic macroeconomics credible? No, because its relationship with 
economic policy was based on rigid and exogenous behavioral assumptions (i.e. it 
considered the behavior of agents to be fixed). Yet what can be true in the short-term is 
not always in the medium or long term. The idea that public policymakers could 
manipulate agents at will was naive. “You may fool all the people some of the time, you 
can even fool some of the people all of the time, but you cannot fool all of the people all 
the time.” (A. Lincoln). Satisfied with the coherence of the rather simplistic reasoning on 
which the analytical framework of their science was founded, macroeconomists believed 
for several decades they had elevated their discipline to the status “hard” science like 
physics or chemistry. Yet, the idea behind the Philips curve was quite simplistic. 
Economic policymakers could fool the agents by faulting their expectations. At no time 
did the emerging macroeconomic science consider that agents can react to or even 
anticipate on circumstances and policies, and adopt unanticipated behaviors. 
 
Careful studies of how markets actually function around the world and analyses of 
decision-making processes by investors and consumers would have been enough to 
invalidate such a rigid theory. Economic historians and sociologists have long 
documented cases of thriving peasants and illiterate African entrepreneurs who, despite 
their limited access to institutional credit systems, were able to invalidate the 
macroeconomic strategies of colonial administrations, challenge successfully hegemonic 
companies and powerful business networks, including in places believed to be captive 
markets (see for example Y. Monga, 1996 and Ela, 2006). 
 
3
                                                 
2 It is true that in some countries, wage increases depend on the revision of collective agreements codified 
by the legislation in force and the outcome of negotiations between management and labor (trade unions, 
employers' associations). 
3 The cases in particular of future Nobel Prize laureates Joseph Stiglitz and James Tobin and other 
prominent economists like Peter Diamond, Michael Todaro, John Harris and some others, who made a 
name for themselves at the Institute of Development Studies of Nairobi (Kenya) in the 1960s. 
: it is illusory to imagine any economic policy which would not 
take into account the behavior of agents in an endogenous way. Households and firms 
understand all too well the objectives of the economic policies implemented in their 
environments and, oftentimes, react to them quickly. It is therefore naive to achieve an 6 
 
optimal economic policy based a model wherein the behavior of agents is held constant. 
The effectiveness of economic policy depends on the behavior of agents, and such 
behavior takes into account government decisions. 
 
The conservative revolution of the 1960s and 1970s and the study of anticipations 
invalidated key Keynesian assumptions and showed that the famous trade-off between 
unemployment and inflation was actually an illusion. One obvious reason is the fact that 
the unemployment rate in a market economy cannot drop below a “natural rate”
4
                                                 
4 This rate is also called long-run equilibrium unemployment rate or structural unemployment rate or Non-
Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment (NAIRU). The natural unemployment rate is not constant. It 
is influenced by technological progress, consumer choices and preferences and, especially, the hysteresis 
phenomena. 
 which 
reflects the fraction of the labor force that is unable to work at any given time for various 
reasons. That rate depends on many factors including human capital obsolescence or the 
loss of job skills that worsens unemployment, the fact that some jobseekers may drop out 
of the labor force, the reinforcement of the bargaining power of unionized workers 
against new recruitment, the existence of a generous social protection system, etc. 
 
Having understood that economic agents form their anticipations, not only on the basis of 
observation of past experience, but also on an intuitive and often sophisticated appraisal 
of the manner in which the economy operates, macroeconomists took a bold step 
forward. They understood that the short-term unemployment-inflation trade-off reflected 
in the famous Philips curve was not sustainable in the long term; and that a non-
accelerating inflation rate of unemployment actually transforms the curve into a straight 
line. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, Argentina or Paris, when the central bank 
embarks on an expansionist monetary policy to help the government create the feeling of 
artificial wealth, workers anticipate quite well the future implications of such decision on 
the economy. Having some knowledge on how the central bank acts to control the money 
supply and run an optimal monetary policy, these agents are capable of observing and 
analyzing the decisions of the technocrats—who believe they are infallible—and in so 
doing, can predict the purchasing power risk they could face in the future. In countries 
with powerful trade unions for example, workers immediately incorporate in their salary 
demands the effects of inevitable price increases. Consequently, the monetary policy 
decisions carefully prepared by the authorities do not ultimately have any impact on the 
real economy. 
 
In other words, monetary policy, as an instrument used for stimulating aggregate demand 
and economic growth, even in the short term, is no more than an illusion. It does not even 
help gain in job creation what is lost in the fight against inflation. The constant and 
rational anticipations formed by economic agents have a clear implication: money can 
never seriously influence the general level of economic activity. Any attempt at 
increasing money supply is neutralized immediately by a rise in inflation. When money 
growth has no effect on real economy (or real equilibrium), it is said to be super-neutral 
(Sargent, 1987). The logical conclusion is obvious: the responsibility of the central bank 




Neoclassical economists became quite proud of their findings and very dismissive of 
Keynesian theories or any other approach to economics. Lucas famously wrote: “One 
cannot find good, under-forty economists who identify themselves or their work as 
‘Keynesian’. Indeed, people even take offense if referred to as ‘Keynesians’. At research 
seminars, people don’t take Keynesian theorizing seriously anymore; the audience starts 
to whisper and giggle to one another.” (1980). In response, leading Keynesian economists 
were condescending. Explaining why he would not even dignify Lucas and his other 
critics with an intellectual argument, Solow once said to an interviewer: “Suppose 
someone sits down where you are sitting right now and announces to me that he is 
Napoleon Bonaparte. The last thing I want to do with him is to get involved in a technical 
discussion on cavalry tactics at the Battle of Austerlitz. If I do that, I’m getting tacitly 
drawn into the game that he is Napoleon Bonaparte.”
5
The battle between Keynesian and neoclassical economists eventually led to some sort of 
truce, with each side painfully accepting a compromise. A dominant synthesis—what is 
currently defined as mainstream macroeconomics—emerged an attempt to mediate the 





There is no doubt that strong analytical progress has been made since the days of Adam 
Smith and John Maynard Keynes. However, most of the existing mathematical models of 
economic systems and even business cycles are only remotely reflective of the behavior 
of households, firms, and governments. Their use of microeconomic tools has often 
remained rudimentary, and their neglect of lessons from other disciplines has been a 
 It therefore tried to reconcile the strengths of the neoclassical and new-Keynesian 
frameworks. On the one hand, it used the tools of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
theory, taking preferences, constraints, and optimization as a starting point and then 
building on these microeconomic foundations. This has made free market theoreticians 
happy. On the other hand, it validated the idea of nominal rigidities, which helps explain 
why monetary policy can have real effects in the short run. That consensus framework 
generally assumed that the economy is dominated by monopolistically competitive firms 
that change prices only intermittently, which creates price dynamics and the so-called 
new Keynesian Philips curve. 
 
The elegance of the new, synthetic model did not compensate its most obvious flaw: at 
the core, it considers the economy—any economy—to be a dynamic general equilibrium 
system that deviates from Pareto optimum mainly because of sticky prices. The truth of 
the matter is that there are a number of other market imperfections that constantly force 
the economy to deviate from optimality. Moreover, the key principles for modeling the 
agents’ expectations, preferences, decisions and behavior in the model are simply to 
unrealistic and it is too risky to rely solely on them for policy design. The very idea of 
representative agents, which underlines the current consensus in macroeconomic theory, 
is inconsistent with the heterogeneity that is the dominant feature in almost all 
economies.  
 
                                                 
5 Interview with A. Klamer, quoted in Mankiw (2006). 
6 See Woodford (2003) for a comprehensive exposition. 8 
 
mistake. In fact, progress in macroeconomics may have been inversely proportional to the 
intellectual investment in macroeconomic modeling. Mankiw has observed that “while 
the early macroeconomists were engineers trying to solve practical problems, the 
macroeconomists of the past several decades have been more interested in developing 
analytical tools and establishing theoretical principles.” (2006, p. 30)  
 
Wizards at the Central Banks 
 
Having arrived at this  second major watershed moment of their discipline’s history, 
macroeconomists could have paused a moment to display a minimum degree of modesty. 
They could have realized that the incautious zeal they had shown total reliance on either 
Keynesian or neoclassical principles had misled them too long, and that it was advisable 
henceforth to exhibit some intellectual humility with regard to the complexities, 
rationalities and irrationalities of economic agents. They could have questioned the 
rigidity of certain postulates and the inflexibility of the dominant methodology of their 
discipline. They could have shown interest in the rigorous lessons of the “hard” sciences 
like physics, and in the possible gains they could derived from observing other disciplines 
of the social sciences and even of the humanities.  
 
That was not the case. Having understood that some of the truths - long believed to be 
absolute and used in determining key aspects of macroeconomic policies -  were 
erroneous, researchers embraced as an alternative a new dogma,  mostly based on 
anticipations theory. They believed they had discovered the Holy Grail. The requirement 
of prudence which should have guided their projections was replaced by scientific 
certainty and even an unprecedented analytical arrogance: they thought they understood 
everything and did not need to know anything new. Policymakers could rest on their 
laurels and rely on their advice. 
 
Confident in their ability to design, implement and manage a monetary stabilization 
policy, central bank authorities embarked upon a set of macroeconomic engineering 
techniques aiming at the “Great Moderation”. The idea was to use in a deliberate manner 
the most powerful weapon in their possession - short-term interest rates - not to stimulate 
economic activity and trigger inflation, but to maintain a general level of prices (or to 
control money supply growth). Even if they acknowledged the existence of a natural 
unemployment rate against which their monetary policy could do nothing, they 
confidently relied on statistical analysis to determine the business cycles and structural 
changes in the economy. They thought a sophisticated monitoring of the various 
household and company indices and survey results would allow them to raise or cut 
interest rates without having to worry too much about inflation. In the event of growth 
deceleration, the new recipe derived of the Great Moderation era would consist in cutting 
interest rates, while keeping a close watch on the evolution of production and 
consumption indices, which underlie price trends. 
 
This approach, adopted by almost all central banks, was implemented with a certain 
degree of success to fight the recessions that occurred almost every decade (1981-82, 9 
 
1991-92, and 2001-02). The permanent stabilization of economies became a leitmotiv 
and the journey to prosperity seemed inevitable. The collapse of the New York stock 
exchange in 2000-2001, a crash triggered mainly by the fall of dot-com ventures, was a 
turning point. In an attempt to shield the United States from the type of recession and 
deflation observed in Japan during the 1980s, the Federal Reserve Bank (FED, American 
central bank) lowered its interest rates in a very aggressive way. Between January 2001 
and June 2003, the federal funds rate was lowered twenty-seven times, from 6.5 percent 
to 1 percent! During that period, most economists saluted the purported ingenuity of FED 
governor Alan Greenspan, who was projected in the media as an unmatched economic 
wizard, the greatest artist of the history of finance and macroeconomics.  
 
This loose monetary policy touted as the only means of curbing the recession did not 
cause the resurgence of inflation, thus confirming the myth that central bank 
macroeconomists were infallible experts. But it insidiously caused the formation of a new 
financial bubble, and laid the foundations of the much deeper crisis which today is 
affecting the world economy. It has spread quickly in an increasingly “globalized” world: 
savings used to fund economic activity do not come exclusively from domestic sources. 
They also come from abroad—as a matter of pure accounting, countries with a surplus in 
their balance of payments must invest in countries with current account deficits. In 
addition to the incentive they received over the past decade from the expansionist 
monetary policy of the FED, American investors and bankers could also rely on savings 
inflow not only from Asian countries (China, Japan, South Korea) where consumer 
spending was weak and income growth strong, but also from oil exporting countries 
eager to invest their reserves in lucrative markets. Net foreign savings in the United 
States, estimated between 1 and 1.25 percent of the GDP in 1995, thus leaped to 6 
percent of the GDP in 2006, the equivalent of 825 billion in today’s dollars
7
                                                 
7 Source: Bernanke,(2009).  
. American 
financial markets were flooded with excess liquidity, which was quickly converted into 
unregulated financial innovations on Wall Street and all major international financial 
markets. Obsessed with their fear of recession, central banks around the world pursued 
their strategy of interest rate cuts, all the more so because the indicators at their disposal 
did not show any risk of inflationary pressures.  
 
In this spiral where credit, investment and consumption were encouraged, there was one 
last aggravating factor: the aggressive budget policy adopted by the US government, 
which resulted in a rapid deterioration of the fiscal balance. In its bid to finance the war 
effort in Iraq and Afghanistan, the administration of President George W. Bush increased 
military expenditure while lowering taxes at the same time. The budgetary surplus which 
it had inherited in 2000 quickly turned into a large deficit, financed through Treasury 
bills purchased mostly by the Asian countries with surplus savings. It is interesting to 
note that during this same period, Sub-Saharan African countries, the poorest in the 
world, made efforts to reduce their budget deficits, thus conforming to macroeconomic 
dogmas no longer in force in the western world. 
 10 
 
3. THE MYTH OF THE GREAT MODERATION  
 
Justification for Leveraging 
 
The analytical excitement that swept macroeconomists off their feet caused them to 
overlook the scope of market imperfections, which are essential features of business and 
financial environments. Yet even neoclassical theorists—still the dominant force in 
macroeconomics—would acknowledge that there are often situations where the same 
product can be exchanged at different prices; that certain prices theoretically fixed by the 
market can actually be manipulated by major operators who have information that the 
others do not possess; that on certain markets, much time is needed for supply and 
demand to be in equilibrium; and that in financial markets, the most influential financial 
institutions have the capacity to contract high levels of debt which can, in the event of 
difficulty, trigger systemic effects for which nobody takes responsibility (Solow 2009). 
These imperfections were ignored by mainstream economics, which believed it knew all 
that needed to be known. True, markets around the world have suffered crisis after crisis, 
and economic thought had been enriched by useful lessons from them. Still, the lessons 
drawn from the policy mistakes of the 1930s are not necessarily relevant in the 2000s. 
 
Focusing on what they thought was “optimal” monetary policy, policymakers took a bet 
on the effectiveness of the tools at their disposal. They worshiped the use of interest rates 
that could be used to control money supply and stimulate short-term economic activity. 
To fight the 2000-2001 recession that followed the speculative bubble caused by the 
collapse of Internet (dot.com) stock prices, central bank officials reverted to their 
traditional toolbox. They aggressively reduced interest rates and injected more than 
enough liquidity in the economic system in order to spur consumption and investment. 
That decision, initiated by the FED and implemented in a coordinated manner by many 
other central banks, actually made it possible to reduce the shocks of economic 
deceleration. But it also caused an increase in money supply that could only be controlled 
by a sustained increase in economic activity in various sectors of industry. For many 
agents (firms, households), low interest rates quickly meant more than easy access to 
financial resources: in market economies where risk-taking, inventiveness and innovation 
(Schumpeter, 1982), it also caused a change in the lifestyles of households and in the 
methods of financing of companies.   
 
Economic agents were daring and creative as they accessed and used the liquidity made 
available by the central banks. They cleverly indulged in leveraging by investing little 
sums of money while borrowing larger amounts; in so doing they increased their debt to 
unprecedented levels. Under certain conditions, debt can obviously sustain growth and 
profitability—especially when it funds investment opportunities that meet the market test. 
One  can therefore understand why so many investors would get caught up in the 
excitement. Leverage allows investors to bet to the maximum at the beginning of their 
investment horizon. There is no need to wait until having saved a required amount of 
money over a given period of time before taking large bets. Stock markets record their 
highest profits in relatively few days in one year and it is impossible to predict such days. 11 
 
Maximum investments therefore guarantee investors to make profits when the 
opportunity arises. In addition, in many countries, leveraged investment also offers tax 
advantages: interests on money borrowed for investment (in an unregistered portfolio) 
can be deductible against taxable income. As a consequence, the true borrowing costs are 
kept low. By reinvesting a tax refund, investors or speculators can further accelerate the 
growth of their of mutual funds portfolio. 
 
Leverage can therefore constitute an effective long-term strategy to increase the value of 
a portfolio, since it basically entails getting loans with the hope that investment returns 
will be higher than borrowing costs. But if the economic return on investment is lower 
than borrowing costs, leverage becomes harmful. It then creates a snowball effect on the 
balance sheet. In the  final analysis and simply put, leveraging is a risk transfer 
instrument; it is a sword of Damocles with the potential to hurt the risk-taking firm. In the 
event of bad investment, corporate equity, which normally acts like a safety feature for 
most firms, becomes useless. In such situations, the only way out is either a buyout by 
another firm in better financial standing or government intervention or bankruptcy. When 
used excessively, leveraging can threaten, via domino effect, the stability of a whole 
sector or industry. 
 
That is what happened on Wall Street in September 2008 when Lehman Brothers went 
bankrupt. Money had been supplied to financial investors in very large amounts and for a 
protracted period of time, because central bank authorities believed they could fight the 
2001-2002 recession by adopting a loose monetary policy under the general 
macroeconomic strategy of the Great Moderation. Many investors had engaged in 
leveraging with the goal of boosting rapidly the growth rate of their portfolios. The 
inaction of regulation agencies and independent rating agencies—that had yielded to the 
illusions of the effectiveness of monetary policy—encouraged the spectacular 
development of new, complex and minimally regulated financial products. The intensive 
recourse to increasingly sophisticated innovations as well as the dissemination of 
financial instruments which with time became incomprehensible to users –  including 
workers of the regulation and rating agencies - cost the international financial system 
what was supposed to be its most important or precious asset: transparency. 
 
Frankenstein on Wall Street: The Russian Roulette of Securitization  
 
Many financial market agents throughout the world took advantage of low interest rates 
and embarked on a race to  explore avenues for quick enrichment. Major economic 
operators (especially institutional investors like the large banks, insurance companies, 
mutual funds, hedge funds etc.) borrowed to secure the sizable capital that will enable 
them make substantial profits. An investor who had, say 1 million dollars, and who 
wanted to make a 10 million dollar investment with a potential return of 10 percent could 
borrow the 9 million he needed at 5 percent interest rate. If everything went ahead as he 
envisaged, the investment would yield a return of 1 million dollars, on which he would 
pay 450,000 as interest on his debt. He would pocket the rest, that is, 550,000 dollars. 
This would be a great rate of return: 55 percent of his initial stake of 1 million. The ratio 12 
 
of the full stake of 10 million dollars to the equity of 1 million was then expressed as 10-
to-1 leverage. 
 
Of course, if the operation did not yield any return or if it failed, it would still be 
necessary nevertheless to reimburse the initial borrowed amount and the interest. But in 
financial mathematics, nothing of all that is dramatic: the probability of failure is only 
one the several probabilities that are included in the calculation of expected returns. The 
prospect for spectacular yields is the real motivation for investors, and the main 
determinant of their decisions and behavior. The investor who possessed a start-up capital 
of 1 million dollars had the following reasoning: why stop with a loan of 9 million? Why 
not engage in an even more sizeable transaction if one can raise an even larger amount of 
capital to finance it? It was obviously always a risky path. But isn’t risk an important 
aspect of profit, and a key ingredient of entrepreneurship in the context of market 
economy? At any rate, that was the reasoning adopted by a host of investors and 
speculators on major financial markets in North America, Europe and Asia in the 2000s. 
Very quickly, financial and speculative transactions gained momentum, reaching 30-to-1 
leverage! 
 
From the perspective of bankers, the use of leverage, as one would expect, led them to 
increase lending and to invent a technique to pass on bad risks to others, at least partially. 
To understand this, it should be known that in almost all the countries of the world, banks 
are allowed to issue credit only to a certain limit, usually a specific fraction of their own 
resources. But credit is their business, their “merchandise”. The more they “sell”, the 
more they are likely to make profits. To ensure the distribution of large amounts of credit, 
US banks began in the 1970s to re-sell of some of the items in their credit portfolios, 
usually not the best ones. This practice gave them renewed possibilities to open fresh 
lines of credit while respecting the authorized limits, and to clear up their balance sheets. 
 
The process became to be known as securitization. It consists in transforming less liquid 
assets (i.e. assets for which there is no market because everyone believes that they are 
very risky) into easily negotiable and transferable securities. These assets are said to be 
“toxic” because of their doubtful profitability or the shaky nature of their underlying 
guarantee. The general principle of securitization is simple: a portfolio of these doubtful 
debts (bad loans) is sold to an intermediary who bundles them together with other more 
advantageous securities into an investment vehicle and issues new securities which are 
then sold in secondary markets. These new products are therefore a collection of various 
types of debt: toxic assets mixed with good quality assets. Securitization operations differ 
and are classified according to their relevant underlying assets (asset-backed securities).
8
In the beginning, it was limited to mortgage loans. It was subsequently extended to 
consumer and commercial loans. Everything then became “securitizable”: ordinary credit 
issued by the primary banks, commercial debt, revenue on financial assets or properties 
and royalties. In short, all assets that people could anticipate future fund flows became 
 
 
                                                 
8 Depending on the content of securitization vehicles, these new products have compound names like CBO 
(Collateralised Bond Obligation, a derivative security backed by a pool of bonds with various risk levels), 
CLO (Collateralized Loan Obligation, a derivative security backed by corporate loans), etc. 13 
 
“securitizable”. Stakeholders in financial markets knew that transferable loan portfolios 
being traded contained both good loans and bad loans. But that did not bother anybody 
because new financial activities aiming at mitigating or transferring risks were created at 
the same time—vulture funds for example, which specialize in the acquisition of risky 
debt at very low prices. The aggregate amount of securities issued in Europe which stood 
at 78 billion Euros in 2000 thus soared to 452 billion Euros in 2006. As for American 
emissions, they represented roughly twice these amounts. 
 
Securitization quickly became for banks and insurance companies, but also for non-
financial issuers, a useful tool for balance sheet management (an instrument for altering 
statements of financial position). Not only did it ease the transformation of low-risk 
assets into liquidity, it also facilitated the disposal of high-risk assets, thereby enabling 
companies to limit possible losses and to maintain a sound balance sheet. In the world of 
securitization, financial institutions “originated and distributed” the credit risk rather than 
holding it on their balance sheet. This provided profitable fees and commissions, and an 
increasingly large fraction of their income. The process of generating fees and 
commissions through securitization now appears to be broken and a major source of 
revenues for financial institutions has dried up. One example is that of securitization of 
mortgages, which was running at the annual rate of $1,000 billion in January of 2007, and 
was down 95 percent to an annual rate of $50 billion by January of 2008 (Roubini, 2009). 
 
The main toxic asset that was subject of bank transactions within the framework of 
securitization was the subprime loans. These loans have been the  immediate 
manifestation of the current financial and economic crisis, which started in mid-2007 in 
the United States before spreading to Europe and throughout the world. Subprime loans 
were issued to borrowers who presented a higher risk of default, the normal level of risk 
being the “prime”. For the most part, these were mortgages loans with very high variable 
interest rates. But they also included consumptions loans such as credit card loans or car 
loans. Charmed with the real estate boom that was sustained by lenient central bank 
monetary policies, credit institutions impetuously granted loans to households with very 
modest incomes and weak financial situations by calculating their borrowing capacity on 
the basis of the rising value of the acquired homes. The issuance of credit to these sub-
prime borrowers was encouraged in the United States by political authorities. A 1997 law 
that seeks to promote social equality (Community Reinvestment Act) requires deposit 
banks to lend to people with modest incomes, even if they have weak credit scores, i.e. 
below the “prime rate”
9
As real estate prices increased, bankers and their customers believed they had struck good 
deals, because the sale of a mortgaged house made it possible to repay a loan, regardless 
of its high interest rate. The system functioned artificially on the assumption of a 
. Some credit companies even specialized in this type of 
transaction.  
 
                                                 
9 There is no clear-cut definition of what “subprime borrower” means. But bankers generally consider as 
such any borrower who on the basis of his/her FICO credit score rating represents a very high risk, that is to 
say they possess a credit score of between 500 and 620, scores ranging from 300 to 850, with 678 being the 
median score. A “prime borrower” designates an individual with a good credit score, not carrying a debt 
burden higher than 75 percent and not financing more than 90 percent of the value of his/her mortgage. 14 
 
continuous rise in the value of real estate, which offered a profit margin to each 
stakeholder. When the real estate bubble busted in the United States in 2007 and homes 
prices started to fall, the fictitious nature of this of enrichment process became clear to 
everyone. Imprudent households and speculators could no longer repay their loans, and 
lending institutions which had granted these subprime loans found themselves saddled 
with toxic assets which they did not know how to manage or sell because nobody wanted 
to acquire them within the securitization process. Some companies that had taken on 
excessive amounts of debt in their greedy quest for growth at any cost realized that the 
risk had become too much to bear and that they should start deleveraging by paying off 
debt. This reverse process of deleveraging—with many financial agents rushing to get out 
of credit contracts—amplified the financial crisis, transmitting it from investor to 
investor, bank to bank, and country to country. The macroeconomist, the banker, the 
trader and the broker on the financial markets, each in their sphere of influence, proved to 
be modern Frankensteins.  
 
The crisis exploded and became extremely costly. In the US, the FED reports that 
household wealth, which peaked at 64 trillion dollars in mid-2007, plummeted to 51.5 
trillion at the end of 2008. In other words, 13 trillion dollars of perceived wealth had 
vanished in about one year. As Solow observes, “nothing concrete had changed. 
Buildings still stood; factories were still just as capable of functioning; people had not 
lost their ability to work or their skills or their knowledge of technology. But a population 
that had $64.4 trillion with which to plan their lives discovered in 2008 that they had lost 
20 percent of that.” (2009, 6). To understand the implications of such a large loss of 
wealth, one must remember that an empirically tested rule of thumb is that an additional 
dollar of wealth induces the average US consumer to increase annual spending by an 
amount between 4 and 6 cents. So, the crisis may lead to a potential drop in consumer 
spending in the US in the range of 520-780 billion a year! For developing countries, 
especially for the poorest of them, mistakes made by economists and policymakers in the 
West might be even costlier. 
 
The Cost of the Crisis in Africa  
 
The global crisis will aggravate economic, social and political difficulties in Africa. 
Despite its limited integration into international markets, the continent will experience the 
ripple effects of bank bankruptcies and of the distressed western financial systems where 
many of the mother companies of African banks  operate. To function optimally, a 
commercial bank in Dakar, Lomé or Nairobi needs to keep a stable business relationship 
with correspondent banks in Paris, London or New York. It must hold a business account 
in these western banks to be able to run for example documentary credit operations for its 
African customers who buy or sell goods to suppliers or customers abroad. It is through 
these correspondent banks that exchange transactions are conducted and facilitated. Even 
though the majority of African banks have excess liquidity and are fairly well funded, 
they could not remain unscathed in an international crisis which has weakened their 
correspondents throughout the world. 
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A deceleration in banking activity in Africa would negatively impact the rate of 
economic growth—whose current level cannot significantly help reduce poverty. The 
World Bank (2009) predicts that the GDP growth rate in Saharan Africa will drop from 
4.9 percent in 2008 to 1.7 percent in 2009. Taking an average population growth rate of 
2.5 percent, this would represent a negative growth rate of GDP per capita. This will also 
mean a drop in tax revenues as well as other forms of government revenue, 
notwithstanding the fact that such revenues are needed to finance public expenditure, 
especially in social sectors like education, health and social protection. 
 
That negative spiral could be aggravated by the drop in African exports, which constitute 
the main source of growth for all the small open economies of the continent. Recession in 
the west—the main customer for African economies—certainly implies weaker demand 
for African oil, diamond, copper, cotton, coffee, cocoa, wood, and other commodities. 
Moreover, Africa’s share of the world exports has declined during the last half-century, 
sliding from about 6 percent in 1960 to 3 percent in 2006. 
 
The loss of foreign exchange will be compounded by the decline of private transfers 
(funds flow of nongovernmental organizations for example) and of remittances from 
migrant workers, which constitute an  important funding source for household 
consumption and public investment across the continent. In 2008, Africa had 
approximately 15 million migrant workers (of whom two-thirds were on the continent), 
who contributed about 20 billion dollars of transfers to their countries of origin. 
 
Another transmission channel of the effects of the crisis is the likely decrease in 
development assistance, on which many countries depend for their investments and their 
welfare expenditures. Admittedly, recent statistics indicate that the total net volume of 
government aid to development increased by more than 10 percent in real terms in 2008, 
amounting to 119.8 billion dollars. But these figures, which take into account foreign 
debt reductions, fall short of the targets set in 2005 by the industrialized countries at their 
G-8 summit in Gleneagles (Scotland). 
 
Last but not least, direct foreign investment, which is a good funding source for balance 
of payments deficits, will decrease considerably in the years to come. Already, net private 
capital flows to developing countries fell almost 50 percent, slipping from 1,200 billion 
dollars in 2007 to 686.4 billion dollars in 2008 (World Bank, 2009). 
 
The crisis will also generate social and political costs which are difficult to predict or 
estimate for the time being. An average growth rate lower than the population growth rate 
means a negative per capita rate; this would imply an aggravation of poverty, which 
already affects more than 51 percent of the African population or 390.6 million people.
10
                                                 
10 Source : Chen and Ravallion (2008, Table 6, p. 32). The poverty line here is $ 1.25 per day based on 
statistical data collected in 2005. 
 
Even though poverty does not inevitably result in conflicts, one could expect more 
uncertain and unstable times in many African countries. 
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Clearly, the global crisis has revealed the deficiencies of the dominant macroeconomic 
model. It is urgent to rebuild a new framework for macroeconomic thinking, one that will 
take into account the lessons of the current crisis. This will not be achieved simply by 
proposing a hasty patch of the intellectual framework that legitimized for the Great 
Moderation. It can only be done by finding new answers to difficult policy questions, and 
tackling the theoretical deficit in macroeconomics. 
 
4. FROM MACRO TO POST-MACROECONOMICS  
 
Policy Rationale for Post-macroeconomic Thinking 
 
The validity of the dominant macroeconomic framework is not an abstract problem is of 
interest only to academics. It is an issue with application to the global economic crisis. 
Governments around the world have mostly reacted quickly to the emergency. As a 
consequence, changes in economic policies have taken place at a much faster pace than 
change in real macroeconomic thinking. David Blanchflower, a preeminent economist 
turn into a member of the Bank of England’s monetary policy committee observed 
recently: “As a policymaker I have found the ‘cutting edge’ of current macroeconomic 
research totally inadequate in helping to resolve the problems we currently face.”
11
The urgency of rigorous new macroeconomic thinking is made all the more obvious by 
the fact that some of the policies being promoted to deal with the global crisis can be seen 
as politically motivated. Case in point: the decision by the US government to pass 
legislation that would make it easier for workers to unionize, despite little evidence that 
the flexibility of the labor market had anything to do with the crisis.
 This 
makes it urgent to carefully examine the intellectual foundations of the meltdown of 
some of the pillars of traditional macroeconomics, and to draw theoretical and 
epistemological lessons from the failure. That would help enrich economic knowledge 
and better inform policies which are already being implemented. 
 
The rush to avoid an economic and social disaster has led to the adoption of a fairly broad 
set of new-Keynesian policies summarized in the communiqués from recent G-20 
meetings. They reaffirm the consensus among policymakers in industrial countries—
regardless of the ideological stance of their ruling coalitions—that the current crisis 
reflects market failures that can be easily corrected by strong Government (and not 
always carefully designed) actions in the economy, and that long-term costs and 
consequences of such actions can be addressed at a later time. 
 
12
                                                 
11 Blanchflower, 2009. 
12 With union membership in the US at about 7.5 percent of the private-sector work force, one-third the rate 
in 1983, the enactment of a bill has been criticized by business groups as a political tool for reversing the 
unions’ loss of membership and power. 
 The resurgence of 
rampant protectionism—under such slogans as the “Buy America” clause in the US fiscal 
stimulus package, which has led to similar responses abroad—threatens the progress 
made in international trade negotiations in recent decades. More generally, the rush to 
cure the excesses of capitalism is leading many policymakers to forget its achievements 
(Becker and Murphy, 2009). 17 
 
 
Almost everywhere, swift changes can be observed in monetary policy without clear 
discussion of the corresponding changes in thinking. Central banks are abandoning the 
intellectual consensus of “one tool [short-term interest rates], one target [price stability]” 
that dictated their work for so long.
13
Still, there are suggestions that governments should consider whether controlling asset 
price inflation must be added to the mandate of monetary policy authorities. “Throughout 
the US dot-com and housing price bubbles, the Federal Reserve continued to adhere to its 
 The idea that global financial markets working 
under the supervision of regulatory agencies and monitored by private rating agencies 
concerned with their reputation could price risk and organize financial intermediation 
efficiently has been discredited. The new consensus is that there is no such thing as the 
Great Moderation, and that central banks can no longer focus on the calibration of their 
interest rate tools with the naïve expectation that all other markets would automatically 
adjust. The business cycle had not been subdued and markets are never rational and 
efficient. 
 
This has brought several new questions on the monetary policy agenda: First, what is the 
proper role of central banks in a new world where they can no longer sit on the sidelines 
and focus on one single objective? The global recession occurred against a backdrop of 
price stability, which is supposed to be the cornerstone of macroeconomic policy. Japan’s 
recession of the 1990s also started in a very low inflation environment. It then seems 
obvious that inflation targeting, which has been the main preoccupation of almost all 
major central banks, failed to prevent the build-up of the macroeconomic imbalances that 
led to the crisis. The traditional focus on low and stable inflation was clearly insufficient 
to prevent bank failures and financial contagion. 
 
Because the relationships in financial markets have become very unstable, the private 
sector can no longer be trusted to make all the right decisions necessary for market 
discipline. Central banks are being forced to become lenders of first resort, and to venture 
in new territories where they have no clear comparative advantage. The US FED, for 
instance, has “stepped in to fill the lending vacuum left by banks and Wall Street firms, 
officials have been dragged into murky battles over the creditworthiness of narrow-bore 
industries like motor homes, rental cars, snowmobiles, recreational boats and farm 
equipment — far removed from the central bank’s expertise.” (Andrews, 2009). This 
poses the risk that the important task of allocating credit could become more political and 
less subject to rigorous economic analysis. It also weakens the FED’s reputation of 
political independence and credibility. The US government’s plans to give even more 
responsibility to its central bank—beyond monetary policy—and to convert it into an 
institution in charge of macro-prudential regulation raises questions as to whether it can 
effectively play so many different roles. Moreover, there is legitimate skepticism about 
the FED’s oversight abilities. As Mark Williams put it, “giving the Fed more 
responsibility at this point is like a parent giving his son a bigger and faster car right after 
he crashed the family station wagon” (quoted by Aversa 2009). 
 
                                                 
13 That minimalist formula is generally attributed to David Blanchflower, a member of the Bank of 
England’s monetary policy committee. 18 
 
view that its mandate was to pursue price stability and full employment, not to deflate 
asset price bubbles.  But amid the wreckage caused by the second burst bubble in a 
decade, it is clear that this view needs to be rethought.  If the Fed is not able to keep these 
bubbles from inflating, it will not be able to achieve its other objectives.” (Lin, 2008). 
However, it is unclear whether monetary authorities could be effective in pursuing 
multiple and often conflicting objectives. Preventing asset-price bubbles is certainly a 
noble goal as their bursting raises the risk of deflation in the medium term. But 
macroeconomics has so far been unable to identify the instruments, timing, and explicit 
or implicit targets to be monitored in order to reduce asset price volatility.  
  
Second, what are the appropriate tools that central banks should use to steer the 
economy? Prior to the current crisis, the conventional wisdom followed by almost all 
central banks was to focus on short-term rates (typically the overnight money-market 
rates). While it was acknowledged that such rates had less influence on the level of 
economic activity than those on one-year corporate loans or long-term mortgages, the 
broadly stable relationship between short- and long-term rates provided a framework for 
central bank actions. The situation has now changed substantially: the global saving glut 
has led to a decoupling of trends among various interest rates. Moreover, in dealing with 
the crisis, central banks have gone out of their traditional roles, expanding their lending 
operations considerably through a diverse set of credit types, extending the maturity, and 
using instruments that they never used before. The FED has offered credit lines to 
investment banks; the European Central Bank has guaranteed unlimited funds for up to 
six months instead of one week; the Swiss National Bank has intervened in currency 
markets; the Bank of Japan has bought equities; others such as the Bank of Canada have 
clearly indicated their willingness to go so far as purchasing government or even 
corporate debt to directly increase the quantity of credit. While these are all considered 
“emergency measures”, it is uncertain whether clear exit strategies will be adopted to 
return to “normal” central bank operations.
14
Third, even if the focus of central banks remains on price stability, their ability to 
stimulate growth could be constrained in some countries by continuous declining prices. 
It would then be difficult to reduce interest rates below inflation, that is, to make them 
negative in real terms. It has been argued that the global recession should have already 
brought negative interest rates in most of the Western world. If deflationary pressures 
worsen, real interest rates—the difference between negative inflation rates and nominal 
interest rates—would increase, which would delay the resumption of growth. Faced with 
that possibility, central bankers and macroeconomists need to reexamine the intellectual 
framework for monetary policy. The obvious solution would be simply target higher rates 
of inflation, which gives monetary policy bigger room to maneuver. Another, more 




                                                 
14 Some analysts believe that when the US economy recovers from the crisis and it is time for the FED to 
sell its large holdings in mortgage debt, there will be political pressure—including from the American 
housing lobby—not to do so. History suggests that there can be a bit of hysteresis here: in 1942, the FED 
agreed to hold down long-term interest rates to help finance the war. It took almost a decade for the US 
central bank to extract itself from that commitment. 
15 “There are worse things than inflation, says economist N. Greg Mankiw. We have them now.” Quoted in 
The Economist, 2009. 
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abandoning inflation targets would constitute major strategic changes for central banks, 
and a credibility risk for their reputation. 
 
On  fiscal policy, the global crisis has also raised many old controversies and new 
challenging questions. First, it has not settled the debate over the effectiveness of 
government spending or tax cuts as a way of jumpstarting growth (see Perotti 2007 and 
Blanchard and Perotti 2002). Major fiscal stimulus packages are being implemented 
around the world to complement monetary policy. But in environments where firms are 
facing big adverse shifts in demand, some fiscal policy features such as tax cuts and 
subsidies may have little effect. Moreover, policies to avoid the economic and social 
costs of liquidations through bailouts to large firms in various industries are costly and 
can lead to similar measures abroad, the resurgence of protectionism or even trade wars. 
 
Skeptics of the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus packages in industrialized countries 
usually raise two issues. One is whether a large multiplier from public spending ever 
exists and one is whether such multipliers are subject to diminishing returns. Contrary to 
Keynesian theory, proponents of the so-called Ricardian equivalence point to the fact that 
households tend to adjust their behavior for consumption or saving on the basis of 
expectations about the future. Any fiscal stimulus package is then perceived as immediate 
spending or tax cuts which will need to be repaid in the future. In such situation, it is 
conceivable that the multiplier could be less than 1, in situations where the GDP is given 
and an increase in government spending does not lead to an equal rise in other parts of 
GDP (see Barro 2009). In neoclassical theory, it is even possible to have some rare 
instances of negative multipliers, which points to situations where fiscal contractions 
become expansionary (see Francesco and Pagano, 1990). 
 
Developing countries might not be in the position of implementing counter-cyclical 
policies. Many of them currently have both large current account and fiscal deficits. 
Others have fixed exchange rates (meaning that they cannot freely print money even if 
faced with deflation). Even in countries where there is scope for discretionary spending, 
lessons from history suggest that fiscal policy has too often been pro-cyclical. This is 
partly due to the weaknesses of automatic stabilizers and the pro-cyclical bias that is built 
in almost all discretionary policies. It is also due to the fact that business cycles in 
developing countries are generally more pronounced than in rich countries. And because 
the tax base there is often narrower, creditors are skeptical of bond issuance during bad 
times. Governments in emerging markets are therefore unable to borrow to smooth the 
cycle. Instead, their safest policy is to save more during good times. 
 
The way to break the constraint of Ricardian Equivalence in industrialized countries is 
for them to invest the fiscal stimulus in projects and programs that release bottlenecks to 
growth in developing countries (Lin, 2009). High-return opportunities may be limited in 
industrialized countries where a large share of productive investment has already been 
realized under the market system. By contrast, they tend to abound in developing 
countries. Creating demand quickly could be done by channeling part of the fiscal 
stimulus packages to funding productive investments in the developing world. But even if 
that win-win, global fiscal solution was agreed upon at the level of the international 20 
 
community, it would face difficult political economy obstacles in its implementation, 
both in industrialized and developing countries. 
 
The design and timing of exit strategies from fiscal stimulus packages will also be a 
major policy issue in the years ahead. Most western countries had substantial fiscal 
deficits prior to the crisis, which they chose to fight with even bigger public spending. 
They should therefore be concerned with their long term budget situation. It would be too 
optimistic and even naïve to believe the official justification by politicians, that is, these 
stimulus packages will mostly fund productive investment that stimulate growth and 
generate enough revenue to repay the new debt. Even leaving aside the long-term threats 
associated with worsening deficits (the possibility that of inflation and currency 
depreciations), there is also uncertainty about the timing for declaring victory over the 
crisis, and the risks of reversing too quickly to contractionary fiscal and monetary policy.  
 
Beyond the search for policy solutions to the current crisis, it is necessary to deeply 
reflect on the relevance and effectiveness of macroeconomic knowledge. This requires a 
new approach to the discipline, one which is both flexible and rigorous, which integrates 
new knowledge from other disciplines of the social sciences and the humanities to 
traditional macroeconomics. 
 
Basic Questions on the Growth Mystery 
 
Another important rationale for moving to post-macroeconomics is the need to answer 
some of the most basic questions in economics, and the observation that the growth 
agenda, which is key for prosperity and poverty  reduction—the first one being the 
understanding of business cycles—has stalled in recent years. For a long time, 
economists believed that the growth potential of any given country depended primarily 
on its volume of natural resources, the quantity and the quality of its human capital or 
investments, and its use of the technology available. It was the sparkling intuition of 
Solow growth model. The level of technology available and productivity were considered 
to be exogenous to the model, and were more or less regarded as public goods. Advances 
in growth theory especially through the endogeneization of productivity (technology 
being considered as a private good) have generated a new wave of research that integrates 
into the models some factors previously identified only intuitively. However, the progress 
of knowledge has not led to a clear understanding of the specific factors that allow 
countries to growth at a given point in time—let alone the specific policies to be 
implemented in order to generate sustained growth. In fact, despite the progress, many 
respected macroeconomists still come up with doubtful assertions about the reasons for 
economic failures or successes. 
 
Nowhere is this more evident than in the study of Africa’s poor macroeconomic 
performance, which has been alternately attributed to: the absence or abundance of 
natural resources; the rather high number of landlocked countries; the brutality of its 
tropical climate; the narrowness of its market or the weakness of its social and political 
institutions (Sachs and Warner, 1997). 
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Lacking natural resources or having too many? Japan has hardly any. Yet, its economic 
history, which was marked by two atomic bombs, suggests that it never needed them. 
Compare its endowment in natural resources to the extraordinary geological wealth of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, which may have largely contributed to impoverishment 
and political bankruptcy. Yet, the idea that countries with lots of natural resources suffer 
a “resource curse” (the paradox of plenty) does not hold and cannot be generalized: 
Qatar, Dubai, or even Botswana have been able to use their natural resources to kick-start 
their respective economic development processes. 
 
Being a landlocked country? Switzerland has been one for as long as one can remember. 
Yet, it exploited that condition to rigorously assess its strategic options and to choose an 
optimal growth strategy: its geographical location has perhaps forced it to establish good, 
mutually profitable relations with its neighbors, as its policy makers understood that their 
country’s economic success is dependent on that of the neighboring states. 
 
Hot and humid climate?  Dubai is not in a place known for the gentleness of its 
temperatures, but this has not prevented capital holders of the world from going there to 
invest their savings and even build their second homes which often remain unoccupied. 
Just like Dubai, Gabon, Congo, Angola or Sudan have huge oil reserves yet no retired 
American or Japanese billionaire will consider going there to settle and enjoy his or her 
fortune. 
 
Narrow markets? The size of Singapore or the modest population of Costa Rica did not 
prevent them from positioning themselves as major exporters and from making huge 
gains from their policy choices. With reduced transportation costs, major technological 
progress and a greater coordination of trade policies facilitating exchanges, the potential 
market of any small African country is no longer limited to its borders. The Chadian 
market or the Burundian market is actually the world market, provided that they are able 
to improve their business environment. 
 
Weak and ineffective political institutions? While there is a lot of empirical research 
pointing to large macro effects of “governance” on growth (Acemoglu and Robinson, 
2002), it is still unclear what that concept means precisely. In fact, it is extremely difficult 
to identify specific quantitative measures of institutional quality that are really significant 
in statistical models of growth. The typical measures of institutional quality such as 
“government effectiveness” that are often used in empirical growth investigations rely on 
surveys of perceptions by the private sector of the government’s behavior, not on the 
well-established and sustainable institutional features for which they are proxies 
(property rights, enforcement of contracts, etc.). It is puzzling that some countries that 
have been praised for economic successes and poverty reduction often perform poorly on 
governance indicators (i. e., China or South Korea prior to 1980). Many drivers of growth 
such as trade, education, or even governance, are endogenous and the empirical literature 
has not convincingly disentangled their effects. Moreover, most institutional factors 
associated with growth such as property rights are not easy to establish (in some 
countries, they have resulted from decades or even centuries of sociopolitical changes). 22 
 
This has led some researchers to conclude that “there is no relationship between growth 
and constitutional measures of institutions” (Glaeser et al. 2004). 
 
All these paradoxes confirm at least one thing: macroeconomics is in need of repair. One 
can no longer say, as C. Romer once did, that “Better policy, particularly on the part of 
the Federal Reserve, is directly responsible  for the low inflation and the virtual 
disappearance of the business cycle in the last 25 years,” and that the policy mistakes of 
the 1960s were a painful, but not permanent, detour on the road to excellent economic 
performance.”
16
An important feature in the approach suggested here as post-macroeconomics is the idea 
that economics should always drive towards analytical rigor. A major mistake made by 
the first generation of development economists in the 1950s was to assume that they 
could build a credible and consistent sub-discipline from some sort of “pragmatist 
thinking”, and by ignoring the pressures to produce mathematically consistent analyses. 
That intellectual attitude was largely justified by the difficulty of telling their story of a 
poverty traps and the impossibility at the time to confront market structure in a formal 
way. They believed that the aggregate behavior of a whole economy dominated by 
oligopolistic rather than perfectly competitive industries was the way to go. They were 
right in their suspicion of having to assume perfectly competitive markets but did not 
have the analytical tools to prove it. In fact, economists were only able to formalize their 
intuition in the 1980s and 1990s.
 To the contrary, Solow’s words of disappointment about economics: “In 
fact, ‘modern macro’ has been notable for paying very little attention to data… I am left 
with the feeling that there is nothing in the empirical performance of these models that 
could come close to overcoming a modest skepticism. And more certainly, there is 
nothing to justify reliance on them for serious policy analysis.” (2008). 
 
The Analytics of Humility 
 
17
Economics will retain its unique status among the social sciences only if it can use 
mathematical models and numbers to codify its knowledge and make it easily teachable 
 
 
Unfortunately, their intellectual strategy of neglecting formal models only generated 
hostility and contempt from mainstream economics, as it left out the clarity of reasoning 
and assumptions that underline any given theory. The strict adherence to a discursive 
style eventually meant that development thinkers had to use parables and metaphors to 
make complicated points such as economies of scale (which implies imperfect 
competition), so crucial to their theories. This could only lead to some fuzziness, despite 
the pertinence of their ideas. The choice of a methodological path should be clear.  
Modeling is always part of economic thinking, either explicitly, or implicitly. As 
Krugman pointed out, “the problem is that there is no alternative to models. We all think 
in simplified models, all the time. The sophisticated thing to do is not to pretend to stop 
but to be self-conscious—to be aware that your models are maps rather than reality.” 
 
                                                 
16 C. Romer, quoted by Postrel (2009). 
17 The first successful attempt to translate the key points made by early development economists into a 
simple, formal model is found in Murphy et al. (1989). 23 
 
and reproducible. But it will endure and gain even more credibility if it also goes beyond 
the rigid constraints of simplified modeling to enrich its toolbox with findings and 
lessons from other disciplines. Economic knowledge benefits enormously from the 
technical rigor of mathematical models but it needs not be restricted to such models. 
 
Since this may sound rather general, let me now outline more specifically the 
methodological path ahead through an example. Drawing lessons from recent advances in 
growth research, here is an exposition of why macroeconomics would be enriched by a 
clear rehabilitation of microeconomics. At the outset, it must be said that even the most 
fundamentalist mainstream macroeconomists would acknowledge that the dominant 
framework for growth analysis has so far yielded little actionable results. For sure, 
economists have learned a few things about the general conditions that are conducive to 
growth. Cross-country empirics has highlighted broad differences between high-income 
countries by identifying three types of variables that are correlated to growth: (i) 
Structural variables such as productivity, physical capital, labor force or educational 
attainment; (ii) institutional variables such as the “quality of institutions” (too often 
arbitrarily defined) or governance; and (iii) policy variables such as macroeconomic 
stability, investment climate, financial development or trade openness (though the current 
crisis has shattered the consensus on what these variables should be). 
 
But these lessons are not very helpful as countries vary enormously with regard to 
conditions under which they can generate and sustain high growth. Over the past decades, 
China and Chile have adopted very different policies but were able to grow comfortably. 
Korea and Taiwan have chosen different degrees of government intervention in their 
economies but have done quite well over a long period of time. Qatar has recorded high 
growth rates despite its mediocre governance indicators, while other major oil producers 
such as Gabon or Nigeria have performed poorly. 
 
These puzzling facts have led to new directions in growth research. The existing models 
of growth in cross-country analyses almost invariably are based on the assumption of 
representative firms and representative consumers. In real life—and that is the reason 
why countries with similar conditions and policies may perform quite differently—there 
is a lot of heterogeneity in behavior for firms and consumers, both within and across 
countries. From a methodological viewpoint, the study of growth must give more 
prominence to models where the country is the unit of observation and analysis to one 
where attention is given to the agent (household or firm). 
 
This can be expressed formally as follows: suppose in a given country that the output of 
each agent i, indexed by i = 1,2,…N, is qi. 
 
For simplicity, let’s assume that all agents have identical production functions and that 
each agent’s output is  
 
(1)                                                      qi  = ai ƒ
i (ki, li) 
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with q representing the agent’s endowment in physical capital, l his/her human capital 
and a productivity. 
 
(2)                                    ∑ =
i
i q Q ;   ∑ =
i
i k K ; and ;  ∑ =
i
i l L  
 
From these macro aggregates, one can write 
 
(3)         q = Q/N as the average output and the average output is a = (1/N) ∑
i
i a  
 
The marginal productivity of capital endowment of type j (physical or human) for agent i 
is MP
i
j , with 
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Equation (5) expresses the fact that growth is the result of aggregates and averages, while 
equation (6) stresses the importance of differences in the levels and growth rates of 
productivity among agents. The former is about microeconomic heterogeneity, while the 
latter is about macro view of growth. This approach recognizes the problem of 
endogeneity of economic agents and raises issues of aggregation. But it remains perhaps 
too abstract and a bit too general for operationalization. It therefore needs to be 
complemented by one that highlights both the difficulty of model specification, and the 
importance of heterogeneity and productivity behavior of agents. 
 
The treatment I offer here is a streamlined version of the exposition in Bourguignon 
(2006) and Monga (2007). Starting again from the standard accounting identity of a 
stylized economy where all agents have the same production function, the growth of 
output,  Q ˆ , can be attributed to the growth of the capital stock, K ˆ , the growth of labor 
supply or possibly human capital, L ˆ , and total factor productivity growth,  A ˆ . 
Considering that α  is the capital share of income and (1-α ) is the share of other factors 
in national income, that identity can be written: 
                                                 
18 I have learned this type of formulation from my colleague Luis Serven. 25 
 
 
(7)                                           A L K Q ˆ ˆ ) 1 ( ˆ ˆ + − + ≡ α α  
 
That identity can then be enriched by introducing behavioral relationships linking growth 
in each production factor to a set of variables Z (determinants of growth) that describe the 
initial conditions, policy variables, and institutional environment of the economy. In a 
reduced form model, aggregate growth,Q ˆ , would be a function of Z  and a set of 
parameters β. That is the realm of most of growth empirics. But it is generally carried out 
in a linear and unrealistic way. The more complex and detailed one could be in the 
specification of the function ) , ( Z f β , the closer we would be to understanding the 
heterogeneity of economic agents in any given country. However, given the data 
limitation, it is currently difficult if not impossible to estimate such complicated models 
in a meaningful way. As we take into consideration the fact that economic agents in any 
given country are heterogeneous and that we need to differentiate them by levels of 
productivity for instance—not to mention their objective functions, endowment in 
physical or human capital, access to credit or constraints—then we realize that equation 
(7) can be made more explicit. Focusing on firms and assuming that they all have the 
same shares of capital and  labor coefficients (α and  1- α) with different productivity 
levels, Ai, Bourguignon (2006) has suggested that we consider the production function for 
firm i is as: 
 
(8)                                                  
α α − =
1 . . i i i i l k A q  
 
That gives us the standard growth accounting identity as  
 




i i A w L k w Q ˆ . ˆ ) 1 ( ˆ . ˆ α α  
 
where  i k ˆ  is growth in capital stock of firm i,  i A ˆ  is total factor productivity growth for 
firm i, and  i w  is firm i’s share of effective capital (where “effective capital” is capital 
stock weighted by the productivity term). In this formulation and despite the stringent 
assumption of firms having identical shares of capital and labor, it is easier to see that the 
three sources of aggregate growth (the three terms on the right hand side of the equation) 
display a new dynamics: first term represents overall increase in capital behind which lies 
the investment behavior of individual firms, with an important role being played by the 
reallocation of capital across firms; because of the assumption of perfect labor market 
competition, the second term remains unchanged; and the third term reflects aggregate 
productivity growth, which is derived from differentiated productivity gains of individual 
firms weighted by their shares in effective capital. The next logical step is to introduce 
behavioral relationships that would link Z policy and institutional variables to firm level 
investment behavior and productivity growth. While this would clearly yield more 
insights on the heterogeneity of firms and the sources of growth, it would also highlight 
the complexity of the micro-macro linkages. 
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The Theoretical Path Ahead 
 
Semantic Clarification  
 
The suggestion to move from macroeconomics to post-macroeconomics is obviously 
likely to raise semantic controversies or even confusion. So let me try to clarify what I 
mean what I am suggesting here. The global financial crisis and recession certainly do 
not invalidate everything we have learned about macroeconomics. However, they 
highlight some of the most egregious mistakes of the dominant intellectual 
macroeconomic framework. Post-macroeconomics should not be understood as another 
metanarrative  of the end of metanarratives
19
•  It is the rejection of the analytical consensus that has characterized mainstream 
macroeconomics for decades, and which assumes that there is a single 
methodological route to knowledge, comparable to what Appiah called 
“exclusivism in epistemology, metaphysical realism (there is one truth, which is 
exclusivism in ontology), each underwritten by a unitary notion of reason”.
. It is true that to theorize certain key 
features of the new macroeconomics as post, is, of course, to assume ipso facto another 
narrative. However, my use of the prefix post here suggests and emphasizes much more 
than temporal posterity. Post-macroeconomics should follow from macroeconomics more 
than it follows after macroeconomics. In fact, I do not envisage new macroeconomic 
theories that will emerge from the current crisis as a complete rejection of all of the 
previous knowledge of the discipline.  
 
My theorizing of post-macroeconomics is therefore neither systematically oppositional, 
nor hegemonic. I do not advocate a “dialectic opposition” between macroeconomics and 
post-macroeconomics. Rather, I suggest that the latter builds on the former and goes 
beyond it. Post-macroeconomics should not necessarily be against macroeconomics. 
While there needs to be some repudiation of the founding assumptions that led to the 
desire for a unique grand theory constrained by its own technical limitations, the goal 
should be to avoid the kind of dichotomist approaches that have lead to the validation of a 
dominant, if not unique way of thinking about economics. If there is any single lesson 
from the current global crisis, it is the fact that macroeconomics must been seen as an 
antecedent analytical framework that laid claim to a certain exclusivity of understanding 
and led to ineffective, unrealistic policies in areas as diverse as banking supervision, 
financial regulation, monetary policy, etc. Post-macroeconomics suggests a rejection of 
that claim of exclusivity, and stresses the importance of enriching economic theory with 
new methodological assumptions and new knowledge. Post-  thus should image in 
macroeconomics the meaning of meta in classical metaphysics.  
 
The nuances of the epistemological approach that I propose here might not be fully 
understood and I still anticipate the objection of some readers in a hurry. Let me be very 
explicit with a few instances of what post-macroeconomics entails: 
 
20
                                                 
19 That is the way J.-F. Lyotard (1984) framed postmodernity. See The Postmodern Condition: A Report on 
Knowledge, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press. 




•  It is the rejection of monism in the design of analytical frameworks in 
macroeconomics, and its overthrow by a conception of economics as irreducibly 
plural, with drawing insights from various perspectives from other disciplines of 
the social sciences and beyond. 
 
•  It reacts against the self-righteousness and the elegant but mathematically 
simplistic and often misleading models that have been used for public policy 
around the world since the methodological convergence between new-Keynesians 




For decades, many researchers had argued that economics had nothing to fear from 
enriching itself with lessons and advances from other disciplines (see for instance Ela, 
1990; Galbraith and Monga, 1994; or Mkandawire and Olukoshi, 2002). Unfortunately, 
these suggestions were either neglected or dismissed upfront within what was then 
arbitrarily considered mainstream economics. The global crisis has led even Nobel Prize 
winners to acknowledge that the problem facing economists and policy makers today is 
mostly intellectual—it is the need to confront the systematic failure of thinking, 
especially on the part of macroeconomists. Akerlof and Schiller (2009) for instance, 
identify five elements in what they call “animal spirits”, the omission of which blocks 
conventional economics from either understanding today’s crisis or providing pertinent 
solutions to policy makers for dealing with it. They are: confidence or the lack of it in the 
market place; concern for fairness by economic agents who are often puzzled by the 
behavior of some people in crisis situations; corruption and other anti-social behavior; 
“money illusion”, which makes agents susceptible to being misled by purely nominal 
price movements and not changes in real values; and the reliance on “stories”, which 
justifies herding behavior. 
 
There is now widespread acknowledgement that conventional economic models fail to fit 
the facts in almost all aspects of observable economic behavior. To put it bluntly, “the 
theories economists typically put forth  about how the economy works are too 
simplistic”
21
                                                 
21 Akerlof and Shiller, 2009, p….. See also Acemoglu (2009); Friedman (2009); Colander et al. 2009. 
. What is at stake now is what to incorporate “animal spirits” into economic 
theory, and to make macroeconomic frameworks more relevant to the analysis of 
everyday problems. Unfortunately, the analytical strategy suggested by leading theorist 
still falls short of the needs. After succeeding in highlighting both the rigidity and 
narrowness of mainstream macroeconomic thinking, and its disastrous implications for 
policy, Akerlof and Shiller’s attempt to “clean up macroeconomics and make it more 
scientific” also fails to offer a convincing alternative. The main reason is that they 
propose an unrealistic approach to the search for a better theoretical strategy. Discussing 
what is usually included in conventional economic theory and what is not, they basically 
suggest to start with a square divided into four boxes, denoting motives that are economic 
or noneconomic, and responses that are rational or irrational. They then observe that 
current economic models fill only the upper left-hand box, as they only answer the 28 
 
question: how does the economy behave if people only have economic motives and 
respond to them rationally. To understand exactly what they suggest, I offer below my 
own visual illustration of their argument, which shows that macroeconomists have so far 
focused on Box 1 in Figure 1, and neglected Boxes 2, 3, and 4. 
 
 
















The main problem with such a schematic analysis is that it relies on an arbitrary 
definition of what constitute “economic” or “noneconomic” motives, and what is to be 
considered “rational” or “irrational” responses. If someone who chooses to buy organic 
coffee instead of the regular food store brand because it tastes better, that is presumably 
an “economic” motive. But what if the choice is motivated also by the supposed low 
impact of organic coffee on the environment and the higher income revenue from coffee 
farmers? Likewise, poor household heads who take their children out of school after an 
economic crisis because they have lost a fraction of their already low income and need 
extra help to compensate for it may be acting “irrationally”: they deprive their children 
and their society with the opportunity to build a much needed human capital. Still, given 
their situation, pulling children from school is a “rational” way of getting extra labor at 
their disposal to cope with negative shocks. These examples show that the distinctions 
between “economic” and “noneconomic” motives and between “rational” and irrational” 
responses are not very useful pillars for designing a rigorous theoretical macroeconomic 
framework. As Friedman pointed out, “an ‘economic’ motive is whatever economists 
include in their theories of how people behave. And since different economists are always 
proposing different theories, what constitute and ‘economic’ motive can differ from one 
theory, and one economist, to another.” (2009: 43) 
 
The reconstruction of the analytical framework for analyzing key macroeconomic 
questions must also take into account the specific nature of each social environment, and 
adjust to changing times. Much can be learned from the study of African economies, 
recent advances in growth research, and lessons from other sub-disciplines of economics 
and various fields of the social sciences. All this new knowledge can help address the 











that could provide answers on 
how the macroeconomy behaves29 
 
 
Methodological Insights from the Study of Africa 
 
It is now a well-documented fact that economic problems and the challenges of 
development are often of a different nature than those observed in the industrialized 
countries. Yet for decades, African policy makers and central banks governors have 
simply, but regrettably, replicated in their respective contexts the dominant 
macroeconomic models used in western economies. The ineffectiveness of this approach 
sustained the analytical shallowness of economic thinking on Africa. This was 
compounded by the extreme dominance of the Washington Consensus,
22
Basic common sense suggested that the formulation of Africa’s macroeconomics takes 
into account the peculiar nature and structure of the developing countries, and their 
specific needs. The diversity of successful development experiences also indicated 
clearly that effective macroeconomics could not be a transplantation of a universal, 
foreign model built on shaky theoretical knowledge. Even the fact that the continent is 
made up mostly of small open economies should have invalidated the blind faith that 
policymakers had in macroeconomic models and policies imported from the United 
States, France or Germany, and look for lessons and experiences from Australia, Ireland, 
Sweden or some Asian countries. Unfortunately, it took quite a while to mainstream 
economists to acknowledge that a suitable macroeconomic model for a typical African 
economy should address problems caused by the random interventions  of the 
omnipresent yet failing state, and its main corollary -- generalized price controls. In these 
low-income societies, such intervention paradoxically pushes up the demand of goods, 
and represses inflation (see Beasley 1988). The situation is often compounded by a 
widely prevalent system of corruption, which can even be legitimized by beliefs and 
customs entrenched at all levels of society. Guided by their anticipations, economic 
agents constantly adjust their savings and investment habits, a move which influences 
money supply and demand, as well as the effectiveness of public policies. It is therefore 
not surprising that Africa is the continent where the largest part of private savings is held 
abroad.
 a rather rigid 
framework which many economists in the Bretton Woods institutions embraced without 
reservation.  
 
23 These considerations should guide the design of macroeconomic models in 
Africa.
24
On a purely methodological level, the soft consensus underlying mainstream 
macroeconomics in the western world (and often replicated in many developing 
 
 
                                                 
22 Williamson coined the words Washington Consensus in 1989 to describe a set of economic policies 
initially aiming at helping Latin American countries emerge from underdevelopment and build strong 
economies. The World Bank and the IMF quickly tied their financial assistance to the implementation of 
these policies, whose specific goals were to reinforce budgetary discipline, boost financial and commercial 
liberalization, and promote the privatization of state-owned companies; see Williamson (2005). For a 
critical analysis, see Monga (2006). 
23 Analyzing a sample of 51 countries, Collier et al. (1999) estimate that the proportion of private wealth 
held abroad ranges from 3 percent (in South Asia) to 39 percent (in Africa).  
24 A few initiatives taken here and there in this direction have not significantly influenced the design of 
macroeconomic policies. For a brief overview of this literature, see Collier (1999).  30 
 
countries) must be reconsidered. It relies primarily on the “neo-Keynesian model”, which 
postulates three relations: (i) an aggregate demand relation, where production is 
determined by demand, which itself depends on anticipations made by agents regarding 
future production and future interest rates; s(ii) a relation based on the Philips curve, 
where inflation depends on production as well as on anticipation of future inflation 
levels; and (iii), a relation of monetary policy, which reflects in the model the idea that 
monetary policy can be used to influence prevailing real interest rates.  
 
The availability of new powerful software and computers now makes it possible to carry 
out complex and simultaneous calculations. Macroeconomics is no longer concerned 
solely or primarily with the resolution of differential equations systems. New methods 
such as dynamic stochastic programming, which simultaneously integrate some of the 
lessons of microeconomics (consumer and employee utility maximization, value 
maximization by companies, rational anticipations, detailed specification of 
imperfections, etc.) represent a breakthrough in economics. 
 
Macroeconomists working on African economies have shown that  the basic neo-
Keynesian model, which has been expanded to take into account many imperfections, 
especially those found in credit or employment markets  could be strengthened even 
further (Collier and Mayer 1989). But some fundamental issues remain: first, the amount 
of detailed and disaggregated information necessary for the use of these new dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium models (DSGE) seldom exists in many poor countries. 
Also, the meaning of the structural parameters often generated by DSGE models has 
become so doubtful  (Canova and Sala, 2006)  that  “this may be a case in which 
technology has run ahead of our ability to use it, or at least to use it best.” (Blanchard, 
2008). 
 
In addition, the micro-macro linkages are still ignored in DSGE models, as well as the 
heterogeneity of households and firms, which are too quickly the rapid amalgamated in 
randomly created global categories. Again, the study of African economies sheds light on 
the need to explicitly address issues of aggregation. In the African context, the very idea 
of household (an economic concept that applies to all persons living under the same roof, 
regardless of whether they are linked by family ties) poses conceptual challenges to 
statisticians and demographers (van de Walle, 2006). The same is true for firms, a term so 
general and so broad that it could be quite misleading in economic modeling exercises.  
 
The solution to such difficulties is not for macroeconomists to content themselves with 
structural parameters generated from industrialized economies but rather, to complement 
macroeconomic analyses with microeconomic, country studies, and lessons  from 
thematic  monographs  from other disciplines. Far from weakening  the identity of 
macroeconomics and diluting it, it would enrich it and strengthen the credibility of the 





The subprime mortgage crisis that erupted in the American financial markets in August 
2007 caused an unprecedented global recession and  generated unorthodox and 
unexpected policy responses around the world. It was no surprise to see some leftist 
economists call for an end to the dominance of free market economy. It was, however, a 
matter of concern to hear some developing country leaders complain about the “betrayal 
of globalization”--they have by and large managed their economies much better in the 
past twenty years, only to be hit hard by a crisis that originated in the center of the world 
economy. 
 
The unprecedented nature of the global financial and economic crisis poses a major 
challenge to economists. Legitimate questions are being raised about the relevance of 
some of the most widely used macroeconomic frameworks, and the usefulness of some of 
the pillars of development thinking—the proper role of the government in the economy in 
general and in financial systems in particular, the validity of some of the key features of 
the new-Keynesian framework, which has dominated macroeconomic thinking in recent 
decades, the proper goals and instruments for monetary policy, the appropriate fiscal 
stance, the effectiveness of rating and supervision bodies in an increasingly globalized 
world, and many other important topics. 
 
The debate over whether it is necessary to expand the domain of macroeconomics is an 
old one.  But the heavy financial, human and intellectual costs of the current global 
turmoil provides the opportunity to reopen that discussion, to go beyond the immediate 
policy questions and reexamine the intellectual framework of macroeconomics, which are 
the first-order conditions of the crisis. This obviously poses a serious identity problem for 
macroeconomics: should the discipline, like other social sciences, venture in distant 
territories to seek answers to economic problems – even at the risk of drowning in the 
broad corpus of the social sciences? Or should it continue to limit its aspirations to 
activities it can handle, quantifying and calculating with elegance and precision – even at 
the risk of being viewed as an insensitive, sectarian and overly formalized discipline, 
incapable of rendering a genuine account of reality? 
 
Contrary to Malinvaud, who defined a rather narrow field of investigation for the 
discipline and advised macroeconomists “not to divert his/her focus towards the 
explanation of institutional, social or technical evolutions” (1981, p. 30), this paper 
suggests that macroeconomics should renew itself and update its stock of knowledge. 
Without throwing away the baby with the bath water, I have argued in this paper that the 
time has come for macroeconomists to revisit their dominant model—a model founded 
on the rationality of economic agents and the efficiency of the markets, even in situations 
involving asymmetric information—and to break loose from the diktat of the single 
existing methodological approach, and to draw lessons and tools from microeconomics 
and other disciplines of the social sciences.  Moving from macroeconomics to post-
macroeconomics requires complementing the analytical rigor of the discipline with a less 
formal approach to reality, and a healthy dose of humility. That may be the price to pay 
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